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Abstract  
The paper critically analyses the problem confronting the enforcement and implementation of human rights 
under the Banjul Charter. Although the Charter human rights are comprehensive and far-reaching, concrete and 
meaningful realization of the provisions has been bogged down by ineffective enforcement. The paper examines 
these problems within the context of existing theories and practice of international human rights law by nations. 
It proposes certain measures that will enhance the effective enforcement and implementation of the Charter 
provisions. 
 
1.0 Introduction. 
The concept of human rights has become universal. Its normative standards have not only been adopted in a 
number of notable international treaties and conventions1, its scope and contents have also witnessed periodic 
changes and expansion2. 
However, enforcement and implementation of human rights norms embodied in these international 
instruments remains a challenge. In most cases, enforcement methods and mechanisms are weak and 
ineffective3. A learned scholar captures the position as follows: 
There has been little concrete progress in the direction of establishing 
effective machinery to protect individual rights beyond the points of 
proclaiming conceptions, attempting definitions, making pragmatic 
statements in declarations, establishing organs with limited powers of 
promotion, investigation of the aims and ideals to be realized4. 
Although this observation was made more than four decades ago, it appears the statement remains valid 
till today.  
From the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), the Inter-
American Human Rights Convention (1969)  to the African Charter on Human Right and Peoples Rights (the 
Banjul Charter) 1986, there are problems bordering on the efficacy and efficiency of human Rights enforcement. 
The focus of this paper is to examine critically issues of human rights enforcement and implementation 
under the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. It will examine theories on the obedience to 
international law and by extension, international human rights law. It will then analyze the methods and 
mechanisms of enforcement of human rights under the Banjul Charter.A comparative analysis of similar 
provisions of some regional human rights systems will be made. 
 
2.0 Enforcement of International Human Rights Law- Theory and Practice. 
Enforcement of international human rights law in the municipal or domestic legal systems of sovereign states 
has, most times, been viewed with skepticism5. skeptics are quick to refer to widespread violations of human 
rights provisions embodied in a number of international instruments6 
They contended that human rights violations that have taken place in many places such as Bosnia, 
Cambodia, Iraq, Sierra leone, Nigerian, Burundi etc. are ample evidence of non-legal character of transnational 
human rights7.  The violations committed by more powerful nations such as Russians activities in chachya, 
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American invasion of Iraq  and China`s continuing repression after Tienenmen Square1. The conclusion thus 
reached is  that “international human rights law is not enforced2”. It has also been said that transnational human 
rights norms are not enforceable “because human rights norms are vague and aspirational, because enforcement 
mechanisms are toothless, because treaty regimes are notoriously weak and because national government lacks 
the economic self-interest or the political will to restrain their own human rights violations3”. 
However, Professor Harold Hongju Koh has argued that the contention that international human rights 
norms are unenforceable is unteneable as the notion stems from misunderstanding or the working of law at the 
level of international relations. As he put it: 
Here in Indiana, the law against burglary may be under enforced, they may 
be imperfectly enforced, but they are enforced, through a well understood 
domestic legal process of legislation, adjudication, and executive action. 
That process involves prosecutors, statutes, judges, police officers and 
penalties that  interact, interpret legal norms and work  to internalize those 
norms into value sets of citizens like ourselves. But if we are willing to give 
that answer to the question how is domestic law enforced? Why not similarly 
answer the question whether international human rights law is enforced? I 
will argue that in much the same way, these international norms of 
international human rights law are under-enforced, but they are enforced 
through a complex, little understood legal process that I call transnational 
legal process4 
The writer went on to identify the components of transnational legal process to include three phases of 
institutional interaction whereby global norms of international human rights law are debated, interpreted and 
ultimately internalized by domestic legal systems5. Though he admitted the process often witnessed spectacular 
failures6, it sometimes recorded success too7. He concluded that international human rights law are enforced 
through transnational legal process of institutional interaction interpretation of legal norms and attempts to 
internalize these norms into domestic legal systems8. 
Although profession Harold Koh himself admitted that transnational legal process sometimes recorded 
failures, the process of debating, interpreting and internalizing international human right law seems to be of little 
value as no significant positive impact has been made on human rights situation in most domestic jurisdictions. 
Most international legal rights instruments continue as mere paper work. This process alone, in the absence of 
coercive mechanism, seems incapable of achieving any effective enforcement of international human rights law. 
 
3.0 Theoretical Underpinnings . 
Some theories have been advanced on how transnational legal process promotes national obedience to 
international human rights law. The theories seek to explain the workings of international law and how it 
generally influences or gets integrated into the domestic legal systems of sovereign states. There are explanations 
of power, self-interest or national choices; liberal theory based on rule-legitimacy or political identity; 
communitarian theory and legal process explanations state-to-state level (horizontal) or international legal 
process explanation and transnational legal process theory international-to-national level or ‘vertical’ process. 
Power and self-interest have often been put forward as the basis for the  obedience to international law 
by sovereign states. The realists who subscribe to this view include Thomas Hobbes and in contemporary times, 
there are George Kennan, Hans Morgenthan and Kenry Kissinger9. They asserted that nations never truly “obey” 
international how. They only comply with it because someone else makes them. Under this view, nations can be 
coerced or induced to follow certain rules or indeed to bargain in the shadow of certain incentives. In the end, the 
critical factor is neither altruistic or normative, only realist values of power and coercion10. 
Self-interest rationales have also been advanced as explanation for why nations may choose rationally 
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to follow certain global rules. Nations may decide to cooperate around certain rules which lead to establish what 
international relations call “regimes” governing arrangements in which certain governing norms, rules, and 
decision making procedures come to predominate because the nations in their long-term self-interests have 
calculated that they should follow a presumption favouring compliance with the rules1. Self-interest rationale 
explains why complex global rules have emerged in a whole variety of international areas in which the nations 
have established regimes structured around legal rules born of self-interested cooperation. 
A number of developments in international relations have been explained on the basis on power and 
self-interest. For instance it explains why Iraq ultimately respected the borders of Kuwait. Other nations of the 
world actually came in and drove out Saddam Hussein who was then the leader of Iraq2. 
There are also the liberal theories on why nations obey international law and by extension international 
human rights law. They are based on the principles of “rule legitimate and those of national “political identity” 
The two theories derive their analysis from Immanuel Kant’s pamphlet in 1795,Perpetual Peace. 
Rule legitimacy theorists assert that  nations do feel some sort of internal “Compliance Pull” towards 
certain rules that they feel are legitimate. When rules are perceived to be legitimate on account of the rule 
meeting certain procedural standards or due process, nations tend to obey the rule. They are normatively pulled 
towards the rule by its legitimacy3. There is also the “political identity” view pressed very strongly by members 
of the liberal school. They posit that whether or not nations comply with international law depends  crucially on 
the extent to which their political identities are based on liberal democracy. Adherents of this view opined that 
“promoting democracies that participate in the new global market place is the right thing because we know that 
these democracies are less likely to go to war”4 To these theorists the key variable for whether a nation will or 
not obey international law is whether they can be characterized as “liberal” in identity, i.e having certain 
democratic attributes such as a form of representative government, civil and political rights and an independent 
judicial system dedicated to the rule of law.5 On this view it has been said that the European system of human 
rights works because it is composed of liberal democracies who share reasons for collective obedience.6 
The communitarian theorists, on other part, argued that nations obey international law because of the 
values of the international society of which they are a part. Accordingly, membership in a community promoted 
a sense of strong attachment to it and helps to define how one views the obligation of that community. For 
example, when one becomes a member of a church, he decides that he will now conduct his life differently, for 
example the governments of Russia, Ukraine came under communitarian pressure to obey the European 
Convention on Human Rights because they have all become members of the Council of Europe7 
Finally, there is the legal process explanation on the enforcement of international law, nay transnational 
human rights norms. This is based on the impact or influence of legal norms formulated at the “horizontal’ 
nation state level within inter-governmental process on the domestic legal systems of nations8. At another level 
of “vertical” transnational process, there are discussions and arguments by governments, inter governmental 
organizations, non-governmental organizations and private citizens on why nations should obey these norms – 
international human rights law 9 . Through this vertical dynamic, international rules that are developed at 
government-to-government level gradually worked their way down and become internalized into domestic legal 
structure.10 
It has been said that none of these theories, standing alone, could explain why nations obey 
international law but that all the five theories-power self interest, liberal theories, communitarian theory and 
legal process theory work together to explain obedience to international law by nations. They are complimentary 
conceptual lenses that give richer explanation of why international law does or does not occur in particular 
cases11. An attempt will now be made to analyze enforcement methods and mechanisms of the African human 
rights system, the Banjul Charter. It will suggest which of the theories should drive enforcement and 
implementation of the Charter human right norms. 
 
4.0 Enforcement Mechanisms of the African Human Rights Charter.  
There are three critical organs involved in human rights enforcement under the African human rights system. 
                                                          
1
 Id. 
2
 Id. 
3
 Thomas M. Frank, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations P.24 
4
 Koh Harold Hongju, “How is international Human Rights Law Enforced”? op.cit 
5
 Id. 
6
 Id. 
7
 Id. 
8
 Id. 
9
 Id. 
10
 Id. 
11
 Id. 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.40, 2015 
 
50 
The General Assembly of Heads of State andGovernment, the African human Rights Commission and the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights.  
 
4.1 The General Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
The General Assembly of Heads of State and Government is the highest decision-making body under the 
Charter.1 It receives reports of human right violations from the African human Rights Commission. It thereafter 
directs the Commission to conduct an in-depth study of such cases and report its findings and recommendations 
to the General Assembly.  
The work of the General Assembly here is mere discussion and nothing near enforcement. Compliance 
with the recommendations is at the mercy of the state involved in human rights violation who may choose to 
ignore them. Commenting on the role of the General Assembly in this regard, Nwabueze Ben said: 
Where the Assembly of Heads of State considers the Commission’s report, 
nothing is said on what action it is to take on it, whether it can or should by 
resolution, accept or reject it. Presumably, it is  precluded from doing more 
than just note the report because of the principle of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of member states enshrine in Article II of the A.U. charter, 
the Silence of the Charter on the role of the Assembly of heads of state and 
government is considered an impediment of the effectiveness of the system of 
protection by Institutes by the Charter2 
The General Assembly is thus weak and ineffective. It is not effective in enforcing human rights norms 
of the Charter. It is hamstrung by the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. The 
silence of the Charter on the role of the General Assembly in this regard is also a serious problem. 
It has also been observed that member states are unwilling to accuse one another of human rights violations and 
would rather choose to mutual cover and protect themselves3. The effect is that collective resolve to promote and 
enforce human rights is weakened. Effective enforcement is sacrificed on the altar of political solidarity. 
 
4.2 The African Human Rights Commission 
The mandate of the Commission as stated in Article 45, inter alia is to “ensure the protection of human and 
peoples’ rights under the conditions laid down  by the Charter4 
A writer opined as follows in respect of the mandate of the Commission. 
The African Commission`s ability to execute its decisions has been a disaster. There is nothing to show what it 
has done to execute its decisions…5 
The Commission is not an enforcement organ per se. It has no mandate of enforcement of any kind 
within the whole gamut of its mandate.6 It performs largely supervisory role, the success of which depends on 
the willingness of member-states in cooperate with the Commission. 
 
4.3 The African Court of Justice and Human Rights  
The African Court of Justice and Human Rights has no enforcement mechanism whatsoever. Although the 
Protocol setting up the Court gives access to State-parties to the Protocol, the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples Rights, the African Union, certain governmental bodies in the African Continent, individuals and 
non-governmental organizations , parties to the Protocol, compliance with the decisions or judgments of the 
Court is at the mercy of  the Executive Council of the African Union (made up of Ministers of Foreign Affairs). 
The President of the Court and Justice of the Supreme Court of Ghana, Sophia Akuffo shed some light on how 
the Court’s decisions/ judgment are treated. 
Usually real enforcement of the Court’s  judgment is not always by the Court itself so enforcement can 
always be an issue. But under the Protocol setting of the Court the body that is responsible for monitoring 
compliance is the Executive Council of the African union (make up of Ministers of Foreign Affairs). it reports to 
the Assembly of Heads of States. What are the Court does is that we report to the A.U on our activities. And we 
are specifically required to report on a non-compliance.  We actually report on all cases we have finished and 
non-compliance. Another way we report is that, as soon as we deliver a judgment we do not only serve the 
parties, we also serve the A.U and such judgment are expected to be disseminated among A.U. member- states 7 
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The Court functions more like an administrative body than a judicial organ. Its decisions/judgments are simply 
sent to the Council of Ministers of the African Union for enforcement. The Council like the General Assembly, 
hardly makes any concrete measures to enforce the decisions/ judgment of the Court. 
State reporting under the Banjual Charter 
State reporting is a major human rights enforcement method of the Charter.1 It refers to communications made 
by a state to a specified treaty or charter body regarding the reporting states compliance with treaty obligations 
from time to time.2 
Article 62 of the Banjul Charter states: 
Each state party shall undertake to submit every two years, from the date the 
present charter comes into force, a report on the legislative measures taken 
with a view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognized and 
guaranteed by the Charter. 
It is assumed that state reporting will through publicity impact positively on the human rights of the 
reporting state. No state wants to be seen as deviating from the standards of international law. 3 Publicity thus 
serves as a catalyst for prompting international  community to respond to the deviant state. 
Secondly, state reporting provides an opportunity for a reporting state to reflect on her human rights situation.4 
State reporting under the Banjul Charter has not achieved much success. African states have not been 
diligent on timely reporting.5 They have also not provided relevant and sufficient information in their state 
reporting. 6  In previous years, many states have defaulted in submitting their state reports. These include 
Bostwana, Central African Republic, Cote D’ivoire, Dj,bouti, Equitorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gabon, 
Guniea Bissau, Liberia, Madagasca, Malwi, Niger Sao Tome Principle, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Zambia.7 
Some reports submitted also tell below the standard template.8 
State reporting mechanism thus is not satisfactory enough to make for effective implementation and 
enforcement of the Banjul human rights. States are inconsistent in submitting reports and where they do, they are 
not in conformity with the template provided by the Commission. There are also no punitive measures prescribed 
where state default or where the submitted reports fall below the requirements. 
Under the Inter-American human Rights system, the Inter-American Commission is vested with the 
power to request state report from member-states regarding their human rights situation.9 Unlike the Banjul 
Charter there are also provisions for country report under the Inter-American human rights system. There Inter-
American Commission is vested with broad powers in relation to country report.10 The Commission uses these 
powers often and aggressively such that the use of state report option has been relegated.11 
 
4.4 Individuals/Corporate Body Complaint Mechanism  
The Banjul Charter makes provisions for individuals and non-governmental organizations to file complaints of 
human rights violations against their host governments with the African Human Rights Commission. The 
provisions are obviously meant to enhance human rights enforcement and implementation in the respective 
jurisdictions of member-states. Article 55 provides:  
Before each session, the secretary of the Commission shall make a list of the 
communications other than those of states parties to the present Charter and 
transmit them to the members of the commission, who shall indicate which 
communications should be considered by the Commission. 
The Charter prescribes certain conditions to be fulfilled by individuals and non-governmental 
organizations before they can file complaints with the Commission. These are: disclosure of author’s identity, 
compatibility of the communications with provisions of the Charter, use of non-insulting language against the 
respondent state, its institutions or the African Union, exclusive dependence (reliance) on media for the alleged 
violation, exhaustion of domestic remedies, submission of the communication within a reasonable time after 
final decision of the domestic organs, cases not dealt with and settled before and that the state whose individual 
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is petitioned against must have made a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Commission1 
These conditions are cumbersome and do not make for easy access to the Commission. No wonder only 
a few of such complaints have been successfully filed with the Commission. Most of such complaints were 
struck out for the lack of jurisdiction.2 
The individual complaint mechanism of the Banjul Charter is patterned after that of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Under the Convention, the strategy 
appears also not to be an effective enforcement mechanism. In this respect, Lazius Wildhaber opined as follows: 
The mechanism of individual application is to be seen as the means by which defects in nation 
protection of human rights are defected with a view to correcting them and thus raising the 
general standard of protection of human rights…  thus the court has consistently confirmed 
that it is not empowered to order consequential measures. It establishes the existence of 
violation and the process of giving effect to that finding is left to the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe. Peer pressure being the most likely way to ensure proper execution of 
the judgment for what is after all an international Court.3 
 
4.5 A Critique of the Enforcement Mechanisms of the Banjul Charter 
Enforcement and implementation is a very critical process of any human rights system. Although the substantive 
human rights provisions of the Banjul Charter is very comprehensive and far-reaching, very little has been 
achieved in terms concrete realization of its provisions. 
The General Assembly of Heads of State and Government lacks the political will to enforce the Charter 
provisions. In a metaphorical language, the organ is a toothless dog that barks but cannot bite. The body simply 
publishes the names of states that have violated the Charter provisions without more.4 It relies on peer pressure 
to compel compliance just the same situation under the European human rights system.5 There are no enabling 
provisions under the Banjul Charter which empower the General Assembly to impose punitive measures on 
member-states in breach of human rights violations. This lacuna has rendered the body incapable of effectively 
enforcing the charter provisions. 
The General Assembly has also been adjudged ineffective because of its tendency to refrain from 
accusing one another of human rights violation in the spirit of African solidarity6  The  principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of member- states is also an obstacle in the way of effective human rights 
enforcement.7 
It is been said that the African Human Rights Commission8does not have the mandate to remedy human 
rights violations through individual petition and that the Commission can receive individual complaint  to the 
extent that they reveal massive violations of human rights9. 
The ultimate power of the African Commission is  limited  to  making  recommendation to the General 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government.10 it does not have any credible enforcement mechanism.11 
The African Court of Justice and Human Rights, though now fully functional, is still confronted with 
the problem of enforcing its decisions. The body functions more like an administrative body then a judicial 
organ. It sends its decisions to the Council of Ministers of the African Union for enforcement12. The Council, 
like the General Assembly does practically nothing with the decisions 
 
5.0 Recommendation /Conclusion 
The inauguration of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1986 raised the prospect of 
full and meaningful realization of human rights in all its ramifications- civil and political rights, economic, social 
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and cultural rights and other rights. The realization of these rights, however, has  been bogged down by 
ineffective enforcement and implementation mechanisms. The General Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government needs to show more commitment to issues of human rights. The body should be empowered to 
impose punitive measures in form of economic and even coercive sanctions on member-states in breach of its 
human rights norms. The Charter should be amended along this line. Member-states should henceforth eschew 
the spirit of “African brotherhood” which has prevented them from accusing one another of human right 
violations.1 
State reporting mechanism should be strengthened and be made bi-annual. Independent bodies like the 
non-governmental organizations should also be required to file annual or bi-annual report on human rights 
situation of their host states . This will enhance objective assessment of human rights situation of member- 
states. 
The decisions of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights should be implemented without being 
referred to the Council of Ministers who as political appointees are incapable of any meaningful and concrete 
enforcement. These measures have become imperative so that human rights provisions under the Charter will not 
continue to be a mirage. 
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